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Abstract
In Italian regions hit by earthquakes homeowners typically receive public funds to finance
reconstruction. While these funds are strictly tied to reconstruction work, they are in part
disbursed upfront, leading to significant variation in cash-on-hand. We exploit this variation
to study the effects of liquidity on relatively wealthy households’ consumption. We find a
large and significant response in the first year homeowners receive the cash, and provide
evidence that this response is driven by illiquid households with bank debt. Instead, we
find no evidence that consumption responds to funds paid directly to firms, thus leaving
households’ liquidity unaffected.
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1 Introduction
Recent studies offer theoretical and empirical support to the view that consumption demand
is highly sensitive to changes in the availability of cash-on-hand not only among relatively
poor, presumably credit-constrained households, but also among relatively wealthy ones. At
the theoretical level, leading contributions have emphasized a specific role of cash-on-hand in
determining the scope for and the extent of consumption smoothing by households that optimally
keep a large proportion of their wealth in relatively illiquid assets, such as housing (Kaplan and
Violante, 2014). Correspondingly, a number of empirical studies have produced novel evidence
in line with these theoretical developments, focusing on how consumption behavior varies by
household (mortgage) debt and wealth (Mian and Sufi, 2014; Misra and Surico, 2014; Baker,
2018; Jones et al., 2018; Surico and Trezzi, 2018). In this paper we contribute to the literature by
providing direct evidence on the effects of the variation in liquidity on consumption. As in Gorea
and Midrigan (2017), we focus our study on relatively wealthy households who potentially face
difficulties in tapping home equity through loans or line of credit. Different from the literature,
we consider case studies in which changes in liquidity that are not associated to changes in net
income and do not depend on prior access to credit (e.g., via credit cards).1 We document a
strong consumption response. The effects of liquidity variation are far from marginal, and lead
to changes in expenditure that are substantial relative to yearly household income.
We carry out our analysis using Italian micro data around three major Italian earthquakes—
affecting the Campania and Basilicata regions at the end of 1980, the Emilia Romagna region
in 2012, and the Abruzzo region in 2009, respectively. The reason to consider this sample
is that, in the wake of each of them, the government implemented programs giving relatively
wealthy households—owner-occupiers—access to significant amounts of public funds to finance
reconstruction and repair work on their housing units. So, at one and the same time, the
earthquake (a random event) created the need for expenditure for repairs or rebuilding work,
but also entitled the homeowner households to public financial assistance covering the outlay.
Since the funds paid out by these public programs were at best equal to the expenditure for
reconstruction, they did not increase households’ wealth relative to the pre-earthquake level.2
The specific features of the earthquake regions as well as the modalities of implementing the
public reconstruction programs make the three case studies in our sample particularly suitable for
the purpose of our study. First, at the time of the earthquakes in our sample, the stock of housing
in the disaster region consisted mainly of old buildings not up to anti-seismic specifications, such
that luxury and ordinary housing was comparably vulnerable. Second, eligibility for funding was
not related to households income, liquidity, or wealth; nor it was determined by the homeowner’s
credit history. When, in our first case study, some homeowners were at first excluded by the
funding program, this was due to technical and political factors, with no systematic relation to
1In these respects, the present paper differs from the literature on public subsidy and liquidity constraints,
which studies the effects of the cash transfers that also raise households’ disposable income.
2As explained below, the amount of public assistance to individual households was based on a technical and
economic assessment of the work required to repair the damage to their primary home—regulated according to
common standards and capped.
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the household’s socio-economic profile. Together, these points suggest that, for our purposes,
the fund assignment mechanism can be taken as effectively random.
Third, in two of the earthquakes in our sample, the funds accrued directly to eligible house-
holds and, most notably, were transferred in large part, when not totally, before the reconstruc-
tion work started. As a result, homeowner households ended up with a substantially amount
of (fungible) cash-on-hand. Effectively, the reconstruction programs turned an earthquake into
a one-time random event that converted part of their housing wealth into liquidity: akin to
random loans, households received upfront cash against the liability of a flow of pre-committed
disbursements over time. We can then exploit the fact that homeowners could use the cash for
consumption, consistent with studies that isolate the effects of relaxing liquidity constraints,
e.g., Gorea and Midrigan (2017).3 Conversely, for one of the earthquakes in our sample, recon-
struction funds were paid directly to firms carrying out the work, bypassing households. We
can therefore contrast the results from the other two case studies with one in which, by the
design of the public program, at no point in time did access to the reconstruction funds coincide
with variations in households’ liquidity. In this case, we can study whether reconstruction funds
nonetheless had an effect on consumption, independent of liquidity effects.
Crucial to our empirical strategy, the reconstruction program after the 1980 earthquake
was targeted to residents in virtually the entire Campania region but, for reasons explained in
the body of the paper, it was initially restricted to only a small part of the quake-damaged
zones in Basilicata. The program was extended to this region with a year’s delay, in 1982.
This delay allows us to contrast the consumption behavior of homeowners with and without
immediate access to public funds. That is, we are able to compare the variation in consumption
among homeowner households who lived in the earthquake area hence were exposed to the same
disaster-related shocks, but received cash payments in different years. To further ensure that
we disentangle the effect of differences in liquidity across the two groups, our control group also
includes non-homeowners, who were not eligible for reconstruction funds but arguably benefited
from general policy measures supporting of the area.
In the other two case studies, there was no delay in extending the program to different groups
of homeowners. However, we can exploit panel information on household portfolio composition
that was not available at the time of the first case study. This allows us to identify our treatment
and control groups depending on whether the homeowner households have a high or a low ratio
of liquid wealth to income and have bank debt. In addition, we can control for lagged values of
consumption to allay the concern that non-parallel trends could bias our results.
For our investigation we use surveys by the Bank of Italy that provide detailed data on
consumption, income, demographic and housing tenure status at household level. While these
surveys do not specify the amount of reconstruction funds going to individual households, we
can use the region of residence and housing tenure status (owner-occupier vs non-homeowner) to
identify the group of potential eligible households. Given that, we provide evidence on liquidity
constraints through an intention to treat study design. The baseline empirical specification is
3These authors build a quantitative life-cycle model calibrated to the U.S. economy to assess the relevance of
constraints that preclude homeowners from tapping home equity.
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a double difference-in-differences regression model, where we exploit variability relative to the
households’ housing tenure status, and either region of residence (as an indicator of the time
of access to the reconstruction program in our first case study), or liquidity conditions (in the
other two case studies). Once again, we ensure that both our treated and control groups were
affected by the earthquake—as a control for the direct effect of the earthquake on households
behavior.
Our main results are as follows. In our first quasi-experiment, the earthquake in the South
of Italy, we find that, upon receiving the funds, nondurable consumption by homeowner house-
holds rises by a full 15 percent relative to the control group. This is in relation to funding
that we estimate at about one third of the average yearly household income in the region. In
the Emilia-Romagna study, we show that the relative consumption of homeowner households
with access to the disaster assistance program rises significantly—by about 22 percent—but only
among households with mortgage debt and low liquid assets. Finally, in the third case study
on the Abruzzo earthquake, we find evidence that, when the reconstruction funds go directly to
firms, the consumption of homeowner households is unaffected, independently of their portfolio
liquidity and mortgage debt. Overall, our results that liquidity constrained households increase
their non-durable expenditures significantly after accessing the reconstruction funds, lend sup-
port to the hypothesis that the positive consumption response is specifically driven by variations
in liquidity.
Before proceeding, we should stress that, in our analysis, the unit of observation for consump-
tion, income, liquidity, debt and residence and housing tenure status is the household. While
in the text we may refer to ‘homeowner households’ as ‘homeowners’ for short, the analysis is
always conducted at the household level, not at the individual level.
Related literature Our paper naturally relates to contributions investigating how consump-
tion responds to variation in liquidity associated to changes in borrowing limits. In addition to
Gorea and Midrigan (2017), already discussed above, Gross and Souleles (2002) show that the
response to an increase in the supply of credit—i.e. a rise in credit card limits—is greater for
households close to their credit utilization limit. Aydin (2015) finds that credit availability has
a large and significant effect on spending, although the effect is not necessarily limited to credit
constrained consumers. Further evidence is provided by Gross et al. (2016).4 The nature of our
case study enables us to explore liquidity effects in a similar vein, without however conditioning
them on prior access to credit by the household.
Our evidence is also in line with empirical findings stressing heterogeneity in consumption
behavior depending on households’ debt and wealth. Using the methodology proposed by Blun-
dell et al. (2008), Kaplan et al. (2014) find that wealthy hand-to-mouth households have a high
marginal propensity to consume out of transitory changes in income—a finding that is corrob-
4In general, robust evidence on the consumption impact of changes in credit conditions is hard to produce,
given the well-known difficulty of identifying supply and demand conditions: lenders may increase supply because
they anticipate strong demand; conversely, households may demand more credit in anticipation of large purchases.
In our quasi-experiments entitlement to funds is driven by the random occurrence of a natural disaster, which
attenuates these endogeneity concerns.
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orated by Cloyne and Surico (2016) on a UK sample, using a ‘narrative approach’. Surico and
Trezzi (2018) find that an increase in housing taxes led to a significant reduction in expenditure
by owner-occupiers with mortgages. Baker (2018) shows that heterogeneity in consumption elas-
ticity to income shocks can be explained entirely by credit and liquidity. Moreover, according
to Mian and Sufi (2014) an increase in house prices strongly affects the consumption of low-
income households, who aggressively borrow against housing equity, but has virtually no effect
on high-income households.
In two critical dimensions, our main finding—that the consumption of illiquid households
rises significantly in the year they receive the public funds—also resonates with many works
on U.S. counter-cyclical stimulus programs in 2001 and 2008, suggesting that: (i) households
spend a non-negligible share of the cash transfers (on nondurable goods); (ii) there is significant
heterogeneity in consumption responses, owing to differences in homeowners’ relative liquidity
and indebtedness. These studies include Agarwal et al. (2007), showing that the strongest
response comes from households who are likely to be liquidity constrained ex ante, as well as
Broda and Parker (2014), and Parker et al. (2013), concluding that the 2008 stimulus had a
substantial effect only in the quarter when households received their rebates.5 In these studies,
like ours, consumption varies far more than the permanent income hypothesis would suggest.
Finally, early work by Sawada and Shimizutani (2008) exploits natural disasters as quasi-
experiments in consumption behavior; using survey evidence, these authors find that consump-
tion is not smoothed by those households that considered themselves (ex post) to have been
credit-constrained at the time of the disaster, without however disentangling a specific role for
‘cash-on-hand’, which is the main focus of our study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and empirical
strategy. Section 3 is devoted to the 1980 earthquake case study, with an account of facts,
institutional features, study design, econometric specification and results. Following the same
outline, section 4 covers the 2012 earthquake in Emilia Romagna and the 2009 earthquake in
Abruzzo. Section 5 concludes. An appendix documents the sequence of administrative acts by
which reconstruction funds were allocated in Campania and Basilicata, and shows the results
from additional exercises we carry out in reference to this case study.
2 Data and empirical strategy
Our study relies on the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Households’ Income and Wealth (SHIW),
which provides detailed information on disposable income, consumption, housing tenure status
and number of components of the households, as well as the employment status, education
and age of the householder. For the years of our first case study (the early 1980s), the SHIW
provides repeated cross-sectional data for about 4,000 households, representative of the Italian
population. For the years of the other two earthquakes in our sample, the SHIW also includes
a panel of households and detailed portfolio information.
5Previous evidence on financing constraints at household level was provided by Jappelli (1990) and Jappelli
et al. (1998), among others.
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Unfortunately, the SHIW does not collect household-level information on damages due to
earthquakes, nor benefits from earthquake-related public programs, precluding the possibility
of assessing any reaction to the reconstruction funds at the household level. Thus, our esti-
mate cannot be compared to estimates of partial equilibrium micro-elasticity of consumption
to public transfers. However, since the reconstruction funds are targeted to owner-occupiers in
the (officially declared) earthquake area, we can use housing occupancy status and residence to
identify the population of households that are eligible to receive financial help, including those
who effectively benefit from the program. For this reason, our empirical investigation relies on
an intention-to-treat analysis. We provide evidence on the average variation in consumption for
the entire target group of the program, relative to the control group.
There are key differences in the way public reconstruction programs were implemented across
our case studies that we exploit in our empirical models. A common feature of our 1980 and
2012 earthquake case studies is that the government entitled owner-occupiers with damaged
housing units to financial help that was parameterized to the costs of rebuilding or repair. The
funds were disbursed by local banks, which opened specific credit lines, and made available to
households, in part or in totality, before the realization of the reconstruction work. As this
translated into an upfront availability of cash-on-hand, de facto access to these funds relaxed
any liquidity constraint, when trying to borrow against household equity.
A notable feature specific to the 1980 earthquake in Irpinia is that the early access to the
reconstructions funds was initially limited to a subgroup of eligible households. We can thus
exploit the difference between the early and the late recipients of the funds, to create a control
group of owner-occupiers with the same characteristics (wealth and exposure to the earthquake
shock) of the treatment group—except for the time of their first exposure to the treatment. The
comparison is designed to pick up the impact effect of a rise of liquidity.
Relative to the 1980 case study, in the other two (more recent) cases in our sample, there
was no delay in implementation in the program we can exploit in our study, but we have a richer
set of household-level information on liquidity and mortgage debt. Moreover, we can exploit the
(rotating) panel dimension of the data set. In these case studies, we compare the variation of
consumption, before and after the earthquake, across liquid and illiquid owner-occupiers residing
in the region—who were eligible to receive reconstruction funds. This allows us to control for
wealth variation induced by the earthquake and the reconstruction program. We also compare
liquid and illiquid owner-occupiers relative to the same groups living in the regions adjacent to
the disaster area.
A crucial difference between the 2009 earthquake in Abruzzo and the two other case studies
is that the government did not transfer funds to households to pay contractors, but instead
directly paid the firms carrying out the reconstruction work. This enables us to investigate
whether household consumption responds to reconstruction funds when the public program
differs in one key dimension, namely, whether it translates into a rise in cash-on-hand at the
household level, in addition to financing reconstruction services, or only takes care of the latter,
with no effect on households’ liquidity in the short run.
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In light of these observations, it should be clear that, throughout our study, we derive causal
estimates always using double difference-in-differences, exploiting household status and region of
residence before and after the access to the public reconstruction program. In all our regression
models, the control group consists of households who reside in regions hit by the earthquake.
The control group includes both owner-occupiers (eligible for reconstruction funds) and non-
homeowners (who are not eligible for reconstruction funds). The owner-occupiers are included
in the control group either in the years before and after they receive the first injection of cash
transfers (in the first case study), or in the same year, when liquid (in the other two case
studies). It is important to stress that both our treatment and control groups are exposed to
any direct and indirect general-equilibrium effect induced by the earthquake, in addition to the
equilibrium effects of public interventions, including the reconstruction fund program. This is
key for our causal estimation quantifying the specific effects on consumption attributable to the
disbursement of public reconstruction funds, and the associated variation in households liquidity.
The study design allows us to overcome a number of concerns related to the exclusion restric-
tion that could rise in a difference-in-differences analysis. The damage produced by earthquakes
as large as the ones in our sample are conspicuous at local level. Earthquakes may well have
direct or indirect effects on consumption, beyond those related to the public reconstruction pro-
gram. On the one hand, earthquakes typically generate a negative supply shock, namely the
destruction of physical/infrastructure capital, correlated with firms’ exit and a drop in produc-
tion. On the other hand, reconstruction work generates new jobs and earning opportunities,
increasing the demand for local workers and for locally produced goods and services—with a
positive effect on output and incomes in the earthquake area. So, while private incomes can
be expected to change in the aftermath of an earthquake, the sign of the income change is a
priori ambiguous.6 As already stated, we always compare our treatment group with control
groups consisting of residents in the earthquake area—both groups facing a similar economic
environment. In addition, to further control for any consumption effects of possible variation in
income, we include household income among the regressors.
By the same token, to the extent that an earthquake destroys furniture and appliances,
households may have to replace them (earlier than required by normal wear and tear). Such
material damage may result in a rise in private expenditure irrespective of reconstruction funds.
And while this argument applies mainly to durable goods, it could possibly also extend to some
nondurable items (e.g. clothing). Again, our study design, by which the control group consists
of residents in the disaster area, allows us to control for household expenditures driven by the re-
placement of essential household goods. In any case, to minimize the risk of confusing households’
consumption/saving with replacement expenditures, we use nondurable consumption—that does
not include extraordinary maintenance of the home—as our dependent variable. When data are
available, we also conduct robustness exercises, further distinguishing nondurable expenditure
6Some empirical studies have found that earthquakes have a non-negative impact on average economic activity
and growth (see Cavallo and Noy, 2009; Hochrainer, 2009; Noy, 2009). Porcelli and Trezzi (2014) contrast the
negative supply effects of an earthquake with the positive multiplier effects of public works and tax cuts in the
earthquake regions of Italy.
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on food and non-food items.
Finally, we always include in our regressions a variety of indicators to control for household-
specific differences in consumption expenditure, such as the household size, the age, education
and employment status of the householder, as well as a proxy for the size of the municipality. We
report from the start that our main conclusions do not hinge on the presence of these controls.
3 Consumption and the early access to reconstruction funds
Our first case study bears on the major earthquake in the South of Italy on November 23,
1980. This affected two Italian regions, Campania and Basilicata, with a combined population
of about 6 million (11 percent of the national population). About 350,000 houses collapsed or
were seriously damaged and a much greater number suffered less serious damage (Commissione
Parlamentare di Inchiesta, 1991).7
At the time, the Civil Protection Agency—the institution in charge of coordinating and
organizing disaster relief—was not instituted (it only came into existence in 1992). The response
capability to a disaster was very limited: it took days for the emergency relief teams just to
reach some of the municipalities. Indeed, a few days after the earthquake, the President of
the Republic, in a TV address, vigorously denounced the failures and shortcomings of public
institutions in assisting the earthquake victims.8
These institutional failings had two major consequences that are relevant to our study. First,
to circumvent the problem of inadequate capacity for direct public reconstruction activities, the
government decided to speed up reconstruction by involving households and private firms in a
decentralized fashion.9 From 1981 to 1984 (the period covered by our empirical investigation),
the Italian government budgeted the equivalent of 28.5 percent of the earthquake area GDP
in 1981 (8 trillion of Italian lire) for “reconstruction”. Nearly half went to support households,
financing private contractors to repair and build housing units (see Commissione Parlamentare di
Inchiesta, 1991). Notably, the experience from this earthquake motivated and guided the design
of similar programs also in later decades, after the creation of the Civil Protection Agency.
Second, in order to release reconstruction funds the government laid down strict technical
requirements, but specialized personnel able to verify these requirements were in short supply.
This general lack of resources for these technical surveys in an extensive and relatively inaccessi-
ble territory translated into a severe underestimation of the time needed to complete the process.
It took many months to survey the whole earthquake area and compile the full list of municipal-
ities covered by the earthquake law—it was not completed until twelve months later. Technical
7The earthquake caused 2,743 casualties.
8‘In 1970 the Italian Parliament enacted laws regulating emergency interventions in case of natural disasters.
I now realize that these laws were never translated into practice, as no implementing regulations have ever been
issued. I ask myself: if the emergency centers created by these laws were there, why didn’t they work? How is it
possible that 48 hours after the earthquake there is no sign of their presence in the area?’—televised message to
the nation by Sandro Pertini, November 27, 1980 (own translation).
9The overall response deployed a variety of instruments, such as immediate emergency assistance, temporary
tax relief for residents, and exemption of young people from compulsory military service (see Cipollone and
Rosolia, 2007).
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difficulties in turn interacted with political factors. The regional government in Campania was
closely politically aligned with the central government and this helped to determine the timing
of the surveys in the two regions and the early inclusion of the municipalities in Campania un-
der the earthquake law, already at the start of 1981 or by summer at the latest. The appendix
provides some details on the lengthy process of revising the list of eligible municipalities.
3.1 Institutional setting and study design: Treatment and control groups
The specific modalities of the reconstruction program are key to the design of our empirical
study. The following provides a brief but detailed description. The reconstruction law (Law
219/81) precisely identified which households were eligible for the reconstruction funds, as owner-
occupiers residing in a predetermined list of municipalities. The program was targeted to primary
residences; second and vacation homes only qualified for a small subsidy. The funds were strictly
tied to work required to ‘restore habitability’ of primary residences, covering up to 110 square
meters of repair work, equal to the median size of housing units in the area. More extensive
repair work and any improvement or enlargement relative to the pre-earthquake state of the
house were to be at the expense of the homeowner. The amount of funding was set according to
certified estimates of the costs of repairing earthquake-related damages. These estimates were
produced by technical personnel employed by the municipalities working in coordination with
both local and central authorities, and based on preset engineering and economic standards.
There was limited freedom in selecting firms and there was a government list of pre-qualified
(usually local) firms. The work had to be done according to preset standards and had to be
documented.
It is worth stressing that, as emphasized by the parliamentary committee of inquiry into
criminal infiltration and corruption in the reconstruction period, the initial phase (1981-1984)
was relatively free of the problems that plagued the area later on (Commissione Parlamentare di
Inchiesta, 1991). The committee documented that in the early 1980s public funds were actually
allocated in line with the rules and costs assessed according to technical parameters.10
Housing units included in the programs were classified according to the scale of damage,
into three categories: (i) collapsed, (ii) seriously damaged, and (iii) mildly damaged units. The
owners of category (iii) houses were paid the entire amount of reconstruction funds up front.
Those in the first two categories received one fourth of the total upfront, upon applying to the
funds, and the rest over time, upon documenting expenditures and presenting detailed progress
reports (Law 219/81).
The intensity of the earthquake and the level of destruction were comparable in the Campania
and Basilicata regions—the epicenter in fact was on the border. Yet as noted, by mid-1981,
virtually all the municipalities in Campania were included in the program. Of the region’s 549
10In the late 1980s the government initiated an extensive inquiry into corruption and criminal activities around
the management of public funds for reconstruction (Commissione Parlamentare di Inchiesta, 1991). The par-
liamentary committee of inquiry pointed out that, in general, illegal practices were limited in the first phase of
reconstruction activities, before 1984, when most of the funds were targeted to individual households with very
restrictive criteria. Instead, they became widespread in the second phase, when the funds were employed to
finance a vast program of public works.
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municipalities, 337 were included already by January and another 205 by the end of May. In
the Basilicata region, only the municipalities right at the epicenter were included in the list
compiled in the first half of 1981. The law extending the program to the rest of the Basilicata
municipalities affected by the disaster was not passed until November 13, 1981. As a result, given
the timing required to implement the law, actual disbursements began in different calendar years
in the two regions. Since both the earthquake and the program extension twelve months later
occurred near the end of the calendar year, we can treat 1980, 1981, and 1982 as defining,
respectively, the pre-earthquake period, an interim period when only Campania homeowners
were entitled to funding, and a final period in which Basilicata homeowners too were eligible.
The fact that the reconstruction program was initially targeted to residents in Campania and
was extended to Basilicata region with one year delay is a unique quasi-experimental feature of
our first case study. Because of this feature, we can specify a double difference-in-differences
empirical specification, whereas we compare two groups of homeowners (owner-occupier) residing
in the earthquake areas, depending on whether they have early or late access to funds, as
well as groups of households (non-homeowners) without access to funds, also residing in the
earthquake area.11 We should stress that the reconstruction funds were subject to a widespread
public debate. Because of this debate, while Basilicata residents received funds only in 1982,
the extension of the official disaster area was largely anticipated throughout 1981, especially
from the summer months on. Hence, if the timing of the news about the program extension
was to be considered an important driver of consumption, we should expect some positive
response in Basilicata already in 1981—say, households could have borrowed in anticipation of
receiving financial support in 1982. As shown below (and further discussed in the appendix),
the differences in consumption between Campania and Basilicata residents in 1981 as well as
changes in the consumption of Basilicata residents between 1981 and 1982 are at odds with a
significant role of anticipation effects. Rather, they most naturally reflect variations in cash-
on-hand, consistent with the relevance of constraints preventing households from extracting
liquidity from housing equity.
It is worth stressing once again that the 1980-84 surveys collect much less information than
later surveys. In particular, for our first case study, we can only rely on repeated cross-sections.
This raises potential concerns about possible shifts in the composition of our control group after
the earthquake. One may expect an earthquake to strengthen the incentives for households to
move out of the region. Mobility may be high among poorer households and renters, who are
less tied to the region than households with local property, as well as among richer households,
who may find it easier to sustain the costs of moving. To provide some evidence on this matter,
we analyze the evolution of the population in the two disaster regions. As shown in the Table 1,
we find no significant change in population around the year of the earthquake—a finding that
lessens the above concern. As additional evidence, in Table 2 we look at mean values of key
households characteristics—disposable income, wealth, family size, age, education, employment
status and profession—by comparing owner-occupiers and other households before and after the
11About one half of total households are owner-occupiers.
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earthquake. As expected, we find that, on average, non-homeowner households have less wealth
and lower income than homeowners, as well as a lower percentage of employees among house-
holders. However, these differences are quite stable through time: the difference-in-differences
estimates are insignificantly different from zero.
3.2 Main results
We pool data for the Campania and Basilicata regions and estimate the following empirical
model:
Ci,r,t = α+ λ1Dt + λ2Dr + β1HSs + β2RFr,t + β3 (HSs ·RFr,t) + γXi,r,t + ui,r,t, (1)
where Ci,r,t is nondurable consumption expenditure by household i in region r and year t or
its logarithm; HSs (standing for “Housing Status”) is a dummy equals to 1 for owner-occupier;
RFr,t (“Reconstruction Funds” Region) is a dummy indicating the year when households resid-
ing in the region r receive the funds—equal to 1 for households residing in Campania in 1981
and in Basilicata in 1982, and zero otherwise; Dr is a binary variable for region of residence
(Campania or Basilicata) and Dt is a binary indicator equal to 0 in 1981 and 1 in 1982; Xi,r,t is
the vector of controls, including household disposable income and age, education, employment
status and sector of employment of the head of the household, as well as an index of the size
of the municipality of residence. The binary variable Dr controls for time-invariant differences
in consumption between regions. Most importantly, Dt takes care of national policies, cycli-
cal factors, and changes in household expenditures that are side-effects of the earthquake but
unrelated to reconstruction funds program.
Our coefficient of interest is β3, attached to the interaction between housing status and
regional access to funds, namely HSs ·RFr,t. This coefficient measures the difference in owner-
occupiers’ consumption in the year they gain access to the funds, and the consumption of all
other residents in the earthquake region, including non-homeowner households (not entitled
to reconstruction funds) and owner-occupiers who have not yet received the funds, or have
already received them (one year earlier).12 As explained above, to the extent that the funds are
compensation for prospective costs of repairs, β3 accounts for the effect of a rise in short-run
liquidity on consumption.
Results from estimating equation (1) are presented in Table 3. In Panel A the dependent
variable is the level of consumption, in Panel B its logarithm. In columns (1) and (2), the control
group consists of homeowners in Basilicata in 1981 (who receive reconstruction funds only in
1982), homeowners in Campania in 1982 (the year after they gain access), and non-homeowners
residing in the earthquake area. In Column (3) we drop the non-homeowners from the sample,
12Observe that if the variables Dr, HSs and RFr,t are dropped from our specification, our empirical model
becomes similar to the baseline specification adopted by Parker et al. (2013), whereas a dummy variable is used
to represent the stimulus payment. If, instead, we drop non-homeowners (and the variable RFr,t and HSs)
from our specification, then the model becomes similar to that in Broda and Parker (2014) and in Parker et al.
(2013). In this case, the coefficient β3 would capture differences in consumption only across homeowners, and the
identification would only rely on the delay with which homeowners in Basilicata’s received reconstruction funds.
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and hence HSs and RFr,t from the regression model.
The specification of column (1) includes only region and year dummies; that in column (2)
and (3), the full set of controls. The specification in column (3), without non-homeowners, also
includes the full set of controls.
Column (1) shows that, on average, in the year when they gain access to the funds home-
owners spend 1,000,000 of Italian lire (the equivalent to about 2000 euros in 2016) more than
the control group on nondurable goods. This amounts to a 15 percent increase in consump-
tion demand (see column 1, Panel B).13 Remarkably, our estimates are not sensitive to adding
controls: the effects are similar in magnitude in column (1) and column (2).
Non-homeowners are neither eligible for reconstruction funds, nor they face the need to
finance the repair and reconstruction work on the housing units. The reason to include them in
our study is to control for potential confounding effects from earthquake-related shocks, affecting
all residents in the region. These include, for instance, the effects of many public programs
implemented in the disaster area, over and above the reconstruction fund program. In column
2, the variable HS specifically allows the average consumption of homeowners to differ, upon
receiving the public funds, from non-homeowners residing in the area. The last column suggests
that our main conclusion does not depend on the inclusion of the non-homeowners in the control
group. In fact, the point estimate of the coefficient remains quite stable when non-homeowners
are dropped from the sample (and the variables HS and RF from the set of controls).14
To give a sense of the economic relevance of the reconstruction fund program, in the absence
of direct information from the survey results, we rely on official sources to calculate the total
and average amounts paid out to households.15 Unfortunately, no single official source offers
consolidated amounts of the cash payments paid in the first years after the earthquake, which
are only a fraction of the total funds eventually granted to households. We combine data on
applications for funds, with estimates of the costs of repair and reconstruction by category of
housing. According to official estimates (Commissione Parlamentare di Inchiesta, 1991), the
number of collapsed or severely damaged housing units amounted to 352, 000 units—a bit less
than half the total number of homeowners in the disaster area. On average their proprietors
were eligible for 29 million liras, about one fourth of which (7 million) was paid up front. Hence,
we can estimate that, in the aftermath of the earthquake (1981-82), the owner-occupiers as a
group received up to 2.5 trillion liras. In addition, we need to include the extra funds went to
13Corresponding to a rise in nondurable expenditure we detect evidence of a rise in durable expenditure, possibly
reflecting the effects of earthquake-related damages to the stock of this good. In our dataset, information on total
durable consumption is only available from 1980 on. However, we can obtain a longer record using a subset of
durable expenditures from the survey item consumi reali, for purchases of furniture, works of art and the like. For
consumi reali, we calculate the percentage of households that report a non-zero expenditure, averaged over the
four years before and after the earthquake, i.e. 1977-80 and 1981-84. Across these two periods, this percentage
falls from 10.24 to 7.66 percent in the regions adjacent to the earthquake area; it rises from 8.66 to 12.55 percent
in the earthquake area. Hence, there is a 50 percent increase in the earthquake area, relative to the control group.
The effect is stronger for owner-occupiers than others.
14In the results discussed so far, we have pooled observations from two regions. Since the regions have different
population, it is possible that one of them might exert a disproportionate influence on the results. In the appendix,
we provide evidence that this is not the case, by looking at the evolution of homeowners’ consumption region by
region.
15As noted before, the SHIW does not have information on reconstruction funds.
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the owners of units that suffered only mild damage, about one trillion liras. This brings our
estimate of the total funds paid out to eligible households in 1981-82 to 3.5 trillion liras. The
Italian census of 1981 puts the number of homeowners’ in the earthquake area at about 800,000,
which gives an average disbursement of 4.5 million liras per household, roughly one third of
average household income at the time, equivalent to 9, 000 euros in 2016.
As discussed above, Table 1 indicates that, in the year when they receive cash payment
from the reconstruction fund program, the average expenditure on nondurable consumption by
owner-occupiers was about 1 million liras higher than that by the control group. A 1 million
liras of additional consumption out of an average transfer of 4.5 million liras implies an average
impact MPC out of liquidity of 22 percent. This estimate is in the ball park of estimates of the
liquidity effects on consumption, based on studies relying on variation in the supply of credit. By
way of example, looking at the consumption response to changes in debt driven by an increase
in credit card limits, Gross and Souleles (2002) concludes that the average MPC out of liquidity
ranges between 10-14 percent (higher for households already near the credit limits when these
are lifted), while Aydin (2015) reports an average estimate of about 20 percent. Gross et al.
(2016) find that the MPC increases substantially during a downturn and is positively correlated
with the local unemployment rate—a situation of macroeconomic distress that may characterize
the local economy in the period following the earthquake.
3.3 Homeowners’ consumption over a multi-year horizon
By design, reconstruction funds are compensation for a prospective expenditure, the cost of
repair or rebuilding—whereas both this expenditure and the funds granted against it are jointly
caused by the random event of the earthquake. We should logically expect any impact rise in
consumption in response to variation in cash-on-hand to fade away over a multi-year horizon,
as reconstruction proceeds and households finance its costs.
To investigate this issue, we cannot rely on a comparable quasi-experimental setting as in our
estimate of the consumption response to reconstruction fund. While we cannot pursue causal
inference, we can nonetheless produce some relevant evidence, by comparing the change in the
consumption of homeowners in the disaster area with that of homeowners residing outside this
area over different time horizons.
In what follows, we draw on the reports on reconstruction activities after the earthquake,
to distinguish two periods: two years, 1981-82, when households apply for reconstruction funds
and start to receive at least part of them in cash; and the following two years, when the bulk
of private housing reconstruction work takes place (1983-84). As control areas we use either the
rest of Italy or the regions adjacent to the disaster area—the latter provides a relatively more
homogeneous sample. Since our conclusion does not depend on the definition of the control
group, for brevity we only report the comparison with adjacent regions.
We adopt the following difference-in-differences regression model
Ci,t = α+ ηt + δAi + µQUAKE i,t + γXi,t + εi,t (2)
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where Ci,t is either nondurable consumption expenditure or its log; QUAKE i,t identifies owner-
occupiers residing in the disaster area in different periods, as detailed below; ηt is the time fixed
effect, Ai is a dummy taking value 1 in the disaster area and 0 elsewhere, and Xi,t is the vector
of controls defined above, after equation (1).
Based on this model, we carry out three exercises. In the first, we analyze the change in
consumption between 1980 and the post-earthquake adjustment period 1981-1984 (QUAKE i,t
equals 1 for 1981-84). In the second, we compare consumption in 1980 with 1981-82, the years
when the program was implemented and households gained access to the funds (QUAKE i,t
equals 1 for 1981-82). In the last exercise we compare owner-occupiers consumption in 1981-82
and 1983-84, the core period of reconstruction work (QUAKE i,t equals 1 for 1983-84, and 1981-
82 is the base period). Table 4 shows results for each exercise twice: in Panel A, the dependent
variable is the level of consumption; in Panel B, its logarithm.
The results from these exercises are consistent with the hypothesis underlying our study
design. First, homeowners in the disaster area do not increase their consumption over the
four-year reconstruction horizon relative to the control group. Averaged over 1981-1984, the
nondurable consumption of homeowners in the disaster area does not differ significantly from
1980. It is worth pointing out that this finding helps to allay one potential concern, namely that
these funds constituted a sort of gift, i.e. were over-generous relative to the actual cost of repair
or rebuilding.
Second, there are differences across sub-periods, in line with our main causal estimates:
compared to 1980, nondurable consumption in the earthquake area (relative to that outside the
area) rises in 1981-82—when the reconstruction fund program starts and households gain access
to cash—and then drops sharply in the reconstruction period, 1983-84. The initial increment is
around 6-7 percent (column 2)—the increase is statistically significant in the level specification
of the model, or when the control group includes homeowners in all Italian regions. Consistent
with the result in column 1, the initial increment is followed by a pronounced contraction in
1983-84, which is statistically significant whatever the specification or control group considered.
For comparison, we have also estimated an equation similar to equation (2) for the subgroup
of non-homeowners during the 1980-81 period and found some evidence of a contraction in
consumption. We investigated whether the fall in non-homeowners’ consumption could reflect a
worsening of the housing rental market. As the stock of housing is damaged by the earthquake,
one may expect market forces to put pressure on rents. This explanation turned out to be
weak in our case study. First, after the earthquake, the government provided free or subsidized
housing to the displaced households; second, the Law (“Equo Canone”) regulated and capped
rents in the 1980s. In any case, we have seen that our main results are robust to excluding
non-homeowners from our control group.16
16Further evidence on the present case study is reported in the Appendix.
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4 Heterogeneity in the consumption response
In our first quasi-experiment, we have seen that owner-occupiers as a group respond significantly
to receiving funds for home repair work. This is evidence in line with the hypothesis that
consumption rises in response to variation in liquidity, even when households are relatively
wealthy (homeowners). In this section, we use the other two case studies in our sample to dig
into two specific dimensions of this hypothesis. The first is the extent to which the consumption
response may be heterogeneous across groups of homeowners. Reconstruction funds can be
expected to have a smaller impact on households who are not liquidity-constrained, relative to
households whose wealth is concentrated on a non-liquid asset (housing).
The second issue is whether consumption responds differently to reconstruction funds, de-
pending on whether cash is transferred upfront to the households, for them to use when pur-
chasing reconstruction services, as opposed to no initial cash transfer—as is the case when the
public program channels funds directly to the firms that, once selected by the households, carry
out the reconstruction work.
4.1 The earthquake in Emilia Romagna
Compared with our first case study, the earthquake that struck Emilia-Romagna in 2012, though
strong, was less destructive and more concentrated geographically. The disaster damages 30,000
houses in an area comprising 15 percent of the region’s municipalities. In the aftermath of the
earthquake, the central government identified 53 municipalities as beneficiaries of reconstruction
funds, with the Decree Law 74/2012. The Article 3.1 (a) set out the following modalities of
implementation: Households were given access to bank loans guaranteed by the state, and tax
credit covering the cost of these loans (Decree Law 95/2012).
Specifically, by Article 3-bis homeowners with a (officially certified) damaged unit were enti-
tled to bank loans at low interest rates (because of the state guarantee), and offered the benefit of
a multi-year tax credit covering both the principal and interest paid on these loans. In practice,
households financed the cost of reconstruction work with the cash drawn from the bank, and
service their (low cost) debt with tax savings over a number of years. According to the press and
local sources, the program was implemented quite swiftly, with limited or no delay in setting
up the administrative procedure. According to official sources—see Law D.L. 95/2012 3-bis—
the reconstruction funds paid out via bank loans, largely devoted to residential reconstruction,
amounted to 6 billion euros.
4.1.1 Study design and results
The household finance surveys (SHIW) have much richer information in the years of our second
and third case study, relative to the years of our first case study. Two key features are worth
stressing. First, recent surveys follow a panel of households. Thus, we can estimate our model in
growth rates (as well as in levels). Second, they include a wide range of questions on household
portfolios. Thus, we can refine the treatment group distinguishing households according to
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indicators of liquidity and debt.
Based on this information, we divide homeowners defining a dummy variable ILLIQUID-
DEBT that identifies wealthy-hand-to-mouth homeowners. These are property owners who,
before the earthquake (at the beginning of 2011): (i) held liquid assets (cash and bank deposits)
amounting to less than 50 percent of their disposable income and (ii) had bank debt debt, e.g.
had a mortgage. This definition draws on recent contributions to the literature on transfers.
Specifically, the ratio of liquid wealth to income is in line with the definition proposed by Kaplan
et al. (2014) and the work by Misra and Surico (2014), who revisit the effect of US tax credit
measures in recent years, and show that the consumption of mortgage-holders responds more
strongly to these measures than liquid homeowners.
The Emilia Romagna earthquake occurred in the first half of a survey year (2012), infor-
mation on consumption behavior over the year covered many months in the aftermath of the
earthquake. We can thus use 2012 as a treatment year. As control areas, we used either the rest
of the Italy or the four regions adjacent to the disaster area, namely, Liguria, Tuscany, Marche
and Umbria. In both cases, we exclude the regions of Lombardy and Veneto, since parts of these
regions were also affected by the quake. The results are qualitatively identical for these different
definitions of the control group.
We estimate the following double difference-in-differences specification:
∆Ci,t = α+ β1EMILIAi + β2ILLIQUID-DEBT i + β3EMILIA*ILLIQUID-DEBT i + ρZi,t + εi,t.
(3)
where ∆Ci,t is the two-year growth rate of nondurable consumption, EMILIA and ILLIQUID−
DEBT are dummies for households in Emilia-Romagna region and households characterized by
low liquidity and bank debt, respectively. The vector of controls, Zi,t, always contains the
two-year growth rates of disposable income and the number of members of the household, the
age of the head of household, the two-year variation in the number of household earners, a full
set of dummies for human capital of the householder, occupation of householder, population of
the municipality where the household resides, and whether the householder is the main income
earner. In some specifications we also add the lagged value of ∆Ci,t.
The first column of Table 5 reports the results for our baseline, which compare owner-
occupiers residing in Emilia Romagna and in the four adjacent regions in the restricted control
group. Relative to the consumption of liquid homeowners, the consumption of illiquid home-
owners rises significantly more in the earthquake area than in the adjacent regions. The effect
is economically and statistically significant. According to our point estimate, the difference in
consumption is as high as 17 percent. The results in the second column of Table 5 shows that our
estimate is not sensitive to including lagged consumption growth. This is an important result, as
it indicates that our estimates are not driven by possible differential trends in the consumption
of illiquid homeowners, unrelated to the reconstruction program. That is, the observed change
in consumption is specific to the Emilia Romagna region in the aftermath of the earthquake.
Also, our estimates remain significant, though their magnitude drops slightly, when we extend
the control group to include homeowners in all Italian regions (not shown).
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In the last two columns of Table 5 we split the sample of homeowners into two groups,
according to our variable ILLIQUID-DEBT and estimate a difference-in-differences specification
for each group. Hence, in the sample which includes only illiquid households, the control group
are illiquid households outside of Emilia Romagna. As apparent by comparing the last two
columns of Table 5, the main conclusion from our analysis is virtually unchanged.17
While the SHIWs do not collect information on expenditure on extraordinary maintenance
work, the surveys provide a wealth of detailed information on expenditure on nondurable goods.18
This allows us to dig deeper, and provide evidence on which expenditure categories are the
most responsive to reconstruction funds. Specifically, we distinguish between food and non-
food nondurable expenditure. Using each of these as dependent variable, we estimate again our
empirical specification in growth rates. Table 6 reports the main results. For both expenditure
categories we find that illiquid owner-occupiers increase their consumption by more than liquid
ones. This difference, however, is much larger and statistically significant when the dependent
variable is the non-food component of nondurable consumption—it amounts to 25 percentage
points.
In Table 7 we verify robustness of our results by changing the definition of illiquid households.
We gradually reduce the liquidity-to-income threshold from 50% to 20%. We do not find any
relevant effect of this change.19
Finally, in Table 8 we report evidence on debt and indebtedness of homeowners around
the earthquake year. The main question is whether homeowners may have obtained liquidity
independently of the reconstruction fund program, by borrowing from bank. As shown in the
table, in both Emilia Romagna and the control area, the number of homeowners with debt
remains quite stable over 2008 and 2012, consistent with the idea that homeowners in the
earthquake area did not increase their private debt to finance the reconstruction works. If
anything, the debt to income ratio among households in Emilia Romagna dropped relative to
that in the control area—this ratio decreased from 1.35 to 1.21. In any case, our estimates
regarding consumption and liquidity are not sensitive to adding changes in debt or previous
debt positions to the set of controls.
Overall our results lend support to the hypothesis that wealthy hand-to-mouth households re-
spond significantly to receipt of liquid funds—in line with the relevance of liquidity constraints—
while liquid households behave consistently with the permanent income theory (see, for instance,
Souleles, 1999).20
17If we estimate a regression in the level of consumption over 2010-12, our estimated response is very much
similar to that reported in Table 5.
18Nondurable consumption includes spending on both food and non-food items. The following items are
not included: (i) purchases of valuables, cars, etc., maintenance, alimony, allowances, gifts; (ii) extraordinary
maintenance of dwelling; (iii) rental of dwelling; (iv) mortgage instalments; (v) life insurance premiums; (vi) con-
tributions to supplementary pension schemes. Note that the amount of expenses for extraordinary maintenance
of all property owned by the household is not even part of the durable goods expenditures.
19Since we do not have information on the credit limits of the households and how much additional credit can
households count on, we cannot replicate the strategy by Kaplan and Violante (2014) to adjust the definition of
hand-to-mouth households accordingly.
20Using the same methodology as for the earthquake in the South of Italy, we obtain an estimate of the impact
MPC out of liquidity in the range 0.5-0.8, depending upon model specification. Arguably, as the earthquake
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4.2 The Abruzzo earthquake of 2009
Our third and last quasi-experiment is brought in because it gives us a unique opportunity to
determine whether households respond differently when they benefit from programs financing
the costs of reconstruction services, without having any access to cash payments.
The earthquake that hit the Abruzzo region in 2009 affected 57 of the 305 municipalities of
the region. The epicenter was close to the city of L’Aquila, which suffered the most severe and
pervasive damage. The earthquake caused serious damage to 10,000 buildings.21 Also in this
case, the area hit by the disaster benefited from a massive government reconstruction program.22
Unlike the other programs examined in previous sections, however, the government funds were
paid directly to the construction companies that carried out the reconstruction work, not to
homeowners.23
As for the case of the Emilia Romagna case study, we use a double difference-in-differences
empirical model, comparing the consumption of liquid and illiquid homeowners residing in the
earthquake region, to the consumption of those residing outside the region. SHIW data are
available for 2008 and 2010—the year before and the year after the earthquake. Our empirical
results are shown in Table 9. Different from the the other two case studies, we find no evidence of
a relative rise in nondurable consumption by owner-occupiers in the earthquake region, whether
liquid or illiquid.
In principle, the date when the earthquake occurred (April) leaves open the possibility that
the impact consumption response may have been concentrated in 2009–which is not a survey
year—with no lingering effect in 2010. While this is an important caveat, we observe that
the result for Abruzzo is in line with our first case study—whereas the news about the program
extension to Basilicata municipalities during the summer of 1981 did not produce any detectable
positive effect on consumption in this region during the same year. The hike only took place
when households receive the cash in 1982.
The absence of a differential response in 2010 provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis
that wealth illiquidity is not correlated with faster consumption growth if public support provides
services in kind, rather than in services associated to the availability of (fungible) cash. In this
sense, the results from our third and last case study in our sample complement and strengthen
the conclusions from the other two.
5 Conclusion
This paper sets out empirical evidence on the effects of liquidity on consumption demand. To do
so, we exploit the quasi-experiment nature of public programs in support of homeowners residing
occurred in a year of deep recession, the latter might have exacerbated the financial frictions and constraints
faced by households (Gross et al., 2016).
21The fatalities amounted to 309.
22Public interventions were regulated by Decree Law 39/2009 (28 April) for the emergency phase, and by
Decree Laws 195/2009 and 83/2012 for the post-emergency phase.
23In sharp contrast with the 1980 earthquake, the Italian institutions—the Civil Protection Agency—had the
technical and financial capability to intervene directly.
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in earthquake areas. In our case studies, households experience a significant rise in liquidity as a
consequence of the random realization of a disaster, which simultaneously cause house damages,
hence the need to spend in reconstruction and repair, and entitle households to reconstruction
funds. Since these funds only compensate for the damages, they do not raise households wealth.
However, since funds are paid out in large part upfront, they raise the households’ cash-on-hand,
hence the liquidity component of their wealth.
We find a statistically and economically significant increase in nondurable consumption by
owner-occupiers in the year they receive the cash. We also find heterogeneity across groups of
households. In the Emilia-Romagna case study, for which we have detailed data on wealth, we
find that consumption by liquid homeowners in the disaster area, who are eligible to reconstruc-
tion funds, is no different from that by homeowners outside the disaster area. By contrast, the
consumption by illiquid households rises quite markedly—our point estimates of the difference
in nondurable consumption ranges from 15 to over 20 percent. In the Abruzzo case study, where
households do not receive any cash but only benefit from the program in terms of reconstruction
services (the funds going directly to builders), we find no evidence of a differential consumption
response. Neither liquid nor illiquid households change their consumption, relative to the control
group, in response to the public program.
One important issued raised by our results is that many or most of the households in our
dataset may have been credit-constrained already before the occurrence of the earthquake. We
might think of the reconstruction funds as a universal loan, forced by the occurrence of the
earthquake on every homeowner. Households with liquid wealth do not alter their consumption
expenditure; households with illiquid wealth take advantage of the short-run availability of cash
to bring their nondurable consumption forward in time. This conclusion would be consistent
with the interpretation of the reconstruction program as a policy intervention that made housing
wealth, so to speak, more liquid—that is, as if these households benefited from a temporary fall
in the cost of extracting liquidity from their portfolios. Our contribution consists in documenting
empirically the strength of the demand response to cash disbursements, which neither change
the household’s net income nor go to households manifestly at their borrowing limits.
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Note: The table reports the population in the area affected by the 1980 earthquake from 1975 to 1985. Values
are expressed as percentage points of Italian population. Source: ISTAT.
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Table 2: Difference-in-Differences: Households Characteristics
Size Age Education Employed Employee Wealth Income
Diff 0.1 5.3∗∗∗ 0.2 -2.8 -17.3∗∗ 69419.1∗∗∗ 3421.8∗∗∗
1980 (0.73) (3.33) (1.31) (-0.54) (-2.99) (7.50) (3.91)
Diff-in-Diff -0.2 0.7 0.1 -0.0 2.3 17436.9 304.4
1980-81 (-0.64) (0.32) (0.50) (-0.00) (0.29) (1.39) (0.26)
Observations 669 669 669 669 669 669 669
Note: For each characteristic listed in the headings, the first row of the table reports the results from testing
mean differences between homeowners and non-homeowners residing in the earthquake area in 1980. The
second row of the table reports the result from testing Difference-in-Differences across the two groups over
1980 and 1981. Size is the number of households members; Age is the householder age; Education is an
index of educational qualification (1 = none, 2 = elementary school, 3 = middle school, 4 = high school, 5
= bachelor’s degree, 6 = post-graduate qualification); Employed is the percentage of employed householders;
Employee is the percentage of employee among householders; Wealth is the value of total assets; Income is the
net disposable income excluding income from financial assets. Monetary values are expressed as thousands
of Italian Lire. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Consumption and Early Access to Reconstruction Funds
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Nondurable consumption
HS*RF 1081.82∗∗∗ 1127.77∗∗∗ 1400.23∗∗∗
(304.81) (429.77) (459.37)
RF (Reconstruction Funds Region) -255.23
(392.77)
HS (Housing Status) 38.28
(362.57)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.45
Observations 672 672 288
Panel B: Log of nondurable consumption
HS*RF 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.13∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
RF (Reconstruction Funds Region) -0.06
(0.04)
HS (Housing Status) -0.02
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.48 0.50
Observations 672 672 288
Note: The table shows the response of homeowner household’s nondurable consumption in the year when they
get access to the reconstruction funds. The sample consists of homeowner and non-homeowner households in
Campania and Basilicata over 1981-82 in the first two columns, whereas it consists of homeowner households
only in the last column. The left-hand side variable is nondurable consumption in Panel A and its logarithm
in Panel B. The variable HS (for Housing Status) is a dummy that is equal to 1 for homeowners; RF (for
Reconstruction Funds) is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the region is covered by Earthquake law. Controls refer
to covariates for disposable income (or its logarithm in Panel B), the number of household members (or its
logarithm in Panel B), the number of household earners, the age of the head of household, imputed rent as a
share of disposable income, a full set of dummies for whether the head of household is the main income earner,
the human capital and occupations of householders; irregular inflows of money, and the population of the
municipalities. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance
is denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4: The Medium-run Evolution of Consumption after the Earthquake
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Nondurable consumption
QUAKE 143.43 635.11∗∗ -1044.96∗∗∗
(279.91) (288.43) (317.68)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Quake Area FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.56 0.56
Observations 3601 1987 3083
Panel B: Log of nondurable consumption
QUAKE 0.03 0.06 -0.7∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Quake Area FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.68 0.67
Observations 3601 1987 3083
Note: The table shows the results of Difference-in-Differences models, by comparing homeowners in the
disaster area with homeowners who reside in adjacent regions (South of Italy and Lazio). Columns 1 and
2 compare, respectively, nondurable consumption in 1981-84 and 1981-82 with nondurable consumption in
1980. Column 3 compares consumption in 1981-82 with that in 1983-84. QUAKE identifies homeowners in the
earthquake area in 1981-84 (first specification), 1981-82 (second specification) or 1983-84 (third specification).
All regressions contain a dummy for the earthquake area, year-specific dummies, and the the full set of controls
as in Table 3. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance
is denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Consumption, Liquidity, and Reconstruction Funds
ALL ALL ILLIQUID-DEBT
Yes No
EMILIA 0.02 0.05∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.06∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
ILLIQUID-DEBT -0.06 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
ILLIQUID-DEBT * EMILIA 0.17∗∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.07) (0.06)
Lag ∆C No Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 798 798 164 634
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.28 0.44 0.26
Note: The table compares the two-year growth rate (2010-12) of nondurable consumption across homeowner
households residing in Emilia Romagna and homeowner households residing in adjacent regions (Liguria,
Tuscany, Marche and Umbria). EMILIA is a dummy identifying households residing in Emilia Romagna.
To split the sample according to liquidity and debt, we define the dummy ILLIQUID-DEBT, which equals
1 if, at the beginning of the year before the earthquake, the homeowner household had a mortgage and its
liquid assets was less than 50 percent of disposable income. Controls refer to covariates for the two-year
growth rates of disposable income, the number of household members, the age of the head of household,
the two-year variation in the number of household earners, a full set of dummies for the human capital of
the householder and for whether the householder is the main income earner, occupation of the householder,
and the population in the municipality where the household resides. In the last three specifications we also
add the lag of consumption growth rate to the baseline set of controls. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
Table 6: Food and other Nondurables
Food Other Nondurables
ILLIQUID-DEBT ILLIQUID-DEBT
Yes No Yes No
EMILIA 0.15∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.05
(0.06) (0.03) (0.10) (0.05)
Lag ∆C Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 164 634 162 625
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.27 0.29 0.24
Note: The table extends the results of Table 5 by splitting nondurable consumption into two sub-categories,
food and other nondurables. Differences in the number of observations with respect to Table 5 are due to
missing values for consumption items.
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Table 7: Further Results for Consumption and Liquidity
Liquidity to Income Threshold
40% 30% 20%
EMILIA 0.23∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Lag ∆C Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 155 136 107
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.45 0.45
Note: The table extends results of Table 5 (third column) by changing the liquid assets to income ratio
defining illiquid households.
Table 8: Evolution of Debt around the Earthquake Year
2008 2010 2012
Emilia Romagna
Number of Households 51 53 53
Debt 57,246.2 70,611.3 63,656.3
Debt to Income 120.0 131.3 118.1
Control Area
Number of Households 144 136 106
Debt 42,191.8 40,379.2 52,162.5
Debt to Income 95.9 90.5 124.5
Note: The table reports the number of homeowners indebted as well as the averages of debt and debt to
income. Debt is defined as total liabilities to banks and financial companies.
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Table 9: Consumption and In-kind Reconstruction Funds
ALL ALL ILLIQUID-DEBT
Yes No
ABRUZZO 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.20) (0.04)
ILLIQUID-DEBT 0.03 0.03
(0.04) (0.03)
ILLIQUID-DEBT * ABRUZZO -0.08 -0.05
(0.21) (0.18)
Lag ∆C No Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 861 861 158 703
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.23 0.23 0.23
Note: The table compares the bi-annual (2008-10) growth rate of nondurable consumption across homeowner
households residing in Abruzzo and other regions in the centre-south of Italy. ABRUZZO is a dummy
identifying households residing in Abruzzo. To split the sample according to liquidity and debt, we define
the dummy ILLIQUID-DEBT, which equals 1 if, at the beginning of the year before the earthquake, the
homeowner household had a mortgage and its liquid assets was less than 50 percent of disposable income.
Controls refer to covariates for the two-year growth rates of disposable income, the number of household
members, the age of the head of household, the two-year variation in the number of household earners, a
full set of dummies for human capital of the householder and whether the householder is the main income
earner, occupation of householder, and the population of municipality where the household resides. In the
last three specifications we also add the lag of consumption growth rate to the baseline set of controls.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as
follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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A The evolution of the Earthquake Law in favor of the regions
struck by the earthquake in the South of Italy
The public program defining the state intervention in support of the reconstruction process was
regulated by the ‘Earthquake law’, decree Law 776 of 26 November 1980 (converted into Law
874 of 22 December 1980). While many measures were defined immediately after the disaster,
the lengthy sequence of measures following the initial decree testifies to the complexity of the
process.
1. A government report at the end of December 1980 included an initial proposal for the
list of municipalities, drawn upon behalf of the government by the Regional Council of
Campania. It listed only 339 municipalities, all in Campania.
2. Decree Law 19 of 13 February 1981 contained an article specifying that funds could also
be given to granted quake-damaged households in municipalities not on the lists.
3. Law 128 of 15 April 1981 provided that a new list of municipalities would be issued by 31
May and also clarified some issues concerning the contributions for urgent reconstruction
of damaged houses as recognized by Decree Law 776.
4. The Ministerial Decree of 30 April 1981 and the Prime Minister’s Decree of 22 May 1981
officialized the area affected by earthquake. The area still excludes a large number of mu-
nicipalities in Basilicata, which will be included by November. This exclusion is publically
debated through the summer.
5. On 6 November 1981 an official document drafted by the Prefecture of the Province of
Potenza (Basilicata)—forwarded by the Ministry of the Interior to the Prime Minister’s
office—endorsed the considerations formulated by the President of the Basilicata concern-
ing the need to complete the process of identifying of the regional municipalities affected
by the disaster.
6. The Decree of the Council of Ministers of 13 November, 1981 (following further inspections)
added the entire province of Potenza to the list of eligible municipalities.
B List of variables
In the following we report the main variables used in our study and mean values relative to
a number of characteristics of households or householders in our sample, before and after the
earthquake.
Nondurable consumption, Net disposable income, Number of household members, Number
of household earners, Age of the head of household in years, Imputed rents relative to net
disposable income, as well as a full set of dummies for:
• Whether the head of household is the main income earner;
29
• Education of the householder: none; elementary school; middle school; high school; bach-
elor’s degree; post-graduate qualification;
• Main employment (householder), branch of activity: agriculture; manufacturing, building
and construction; wholesale and retail trade, lodging and catering services; transport and
communication; services of credit and insurance institutions; general government; real
estate and renting services, other professional, business activities and other private and
public services;
• Main employment (householder), occupational status: blue-collar worker or similar; office
worker or school teacher; manager; member of the arts or professions; sole proprietor;
self-employed worker, including unpaid family workers)
• Secondary employment, occupational status (see Main employment occupational status);
• Irregular inflows of income;
• Population of municipality where the household lives: up to 5,000; 5,000-20,000; 20,000-
50,000; 50,000-200,000; over 200,000 inhabitants.
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Table A1: Households Characteristics
Homeowner
Yes No Yes No
1980 1981
Panel A: Campania
Size 3.7 3.6 3.8 3.8
Age 54.9 48.3 53.1 47.9
Education 2.9 2.7 3.0 2.5
Employed 75.2 80.3 70.2 70.0
Employee 44.8 63.9 43.9 56.3
Wealth 84,975 15,399 113,457 15,616
Income 11,196 8,070 15,395 10,643
Observations 105 147 114 213
Panel B: Basilicata
Size 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.7
Age 53.3 55.6 56.9 47.2
Education 1.7 1.6 2.0 2.7
Employed 87.0 79.2 64.0 94.4
Employee 34.8 37.5 44.0 88.9
Wealth 85,185 16,788 65,907 46,830
Income 11,254 6,035 11,150 14,020
Observations 23 24 25 18
Note: The table reports the mean of the characteristics of the households living in the area affected by the
1980 earthquake listed n the first column. Panel A refers to residents in Campania, Panel B to resident in
Basilicta. Results are reported by home ownership (homeowners and non-homeowners) and year (1980 and
1981). Size is the number of households components; Age is the householder age; Education is an index of
educational qualification (1 = none, 2 = elementary school, 3 = middle school, 4 = high school, 5 = bachelor’s
degree, 6 = post-graduate qualification); Employed is the percentage of employed householders; Employee is
the percentage of employee among householders; Wealth is the value of total assets; Income is net disposable
income excluding income from financial assets. Monetary values are expressed as thousands of Italian Lira.
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C Further evidence on the 1980 earthquake
In our empirical specification discussed in the text, we have pooled observations from two regions.
It may be possible, however, that one region might exert a disproportionate influence on the
results. We address this issue by estimating the following difference-in-differences model for each
region separately:
Ci,t = α0 + α1Y EARt + α2HSs + α3 (HSs · Y EARt) + γXi,t + ui,t
where Y EARt is the time fixed effect, HSs identifies the owner-occupier and Xi,t is the vector
of control variables defined above. For each region we estimate the model for the period 1980-81
(Y EARt is 1 for the 1981) and 1981-82 (Y EARt is 1 for 1982). The coefficient α3 gauges the
effects of the program in a region, estimating the change in the mean difference in consump-
tion between homeowners and non-homeowners in the first year of funding—1981 in Campania
(relative to 1980) and 1982 in Basilicata (relative to 1981).
The estimates shown in Table A2 provide a sharper picture of the timing of the consumption
response. In each region the consumption increase appears to be concentrated in the first year of
funding. In 1981, in the almost immediate aftermath of the quake, only Campania homeowners
raise consumption, while those in Basilicata actually reduce their consumption more than non-
homeowners. They rise their expenditure a year later, in 1982, when the program is extended
to their region—note that the point estimate is larger than in Campania.24
The point estimates of the initial decline and subsequent increase in consumption in Basil-
icata are large compared to Campania. To the extent that owner-occupiers started to repair
the damage using cash out of their own pockets, at first they presumably reduced nondurable
consumption. But the interpretation of this result hinges crucially on the degree of confidence
that households may have had, already in 1981, about the extension of the public program to
their region. If they were reasonably certain in anticipating access to reconstruction funds in
1982, the pattern detected in the data would be entirely attributable to liquidity variation.
In the most general specification of the model, we control for the size of the municipality of
residence. Campania has two coastal cities, Naples and Salerno, that are much larger than any
other city in the earthquake area. In principle, the behavior of residents and/or the modalities
of the reconstruction process areas in these metropolitan areas may have been qualitatively
different from that in smaller towns and rural areas. In light of this observation, it is useful
to verify that our results are not overly influenced by the inclusion of the two large cities in
our sample. We therefore re-estimate the empirical models of Table A2 for Campania dropping
Naples and Salerno. As the two cities are roughly the same distance from the epicenter—further
away than all the other municipalities in the sample— our check restricts the treatment area to
municipalities that are both more homogeneous in size and arguably more exposed to the shock
(since closer to the epicenter). In all our model specifications, the point estimates are very close
to those obtained for the full sample. For instance, the rise in consumption is about 13 percent
24Results (not reported) are similar if we run the model with the log of consumption as dependent variable.
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when we exclude residents of the two large cities; it comes down somewhat for the specification
in level, from 1,114,000 to 888,000 Italian lira (results not reported).
Since reliable information on the magnitude of damages at household level is not available,
we cannot properly look at how consumption changes according to the size of the liquidity shock.
However, to provide some evidence on this issue, we close the analysis by splitting our sample of
owner-occupiers in Campania according to the median value of the house, under the assumption
that larger houses are prone to higher values of the damages. As shown in Table A3, we do not
find any difference between the two groups in terms of consumption change.
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Table A2: Consumption and Early Access to Reconstruction Funds, Further Ev-
idence
Campania Basilicata
1980-81 1981-82 1980-81 1981-82
Panel A: Nondurable consumption
HS*YEAR 1114.9∗∗∗ -607.1 -1988.4∗ 3704.0∗∗
(330.4) (457.5) (1109.2) (1704.1)
HS Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.43 0.77 0.73
Observations 579 599 90 73
Panel B: Log of nondurable consumption
HS*YEAR 0.14∗∗ -0.10 -0.02 0.40∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.20) (0.20)
HS Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.49 0.79 0.77
Observations 579 599 90 73
Note: The table shows the results from the Difference-in-Differences model comparing the behavior of home-
owners and non-homeowners before and after receiving reconstruction funds by region—the first two columns
are referred to Campania, the last two to Basilicata. Each sample always consists of both homeowners and
non-homeowners. The left-hand side variable is nondurable consumption in Panel A and its logarithm in
Panel B. YEAR is a dummy which equals 1 in 1981 (first and third columns) or 1982 (second and fourth
columns) and 0 otherwise. HS (for Housing Status) is a dummy that is equal to 1 for homeowners, owner-
occupier. Controls are the same as in Table 3. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Adjusted R2 0.50 0.51
Observations 218 218
Note: The table shows results from the Difference-in-Differences model for homeowners in Campania, over
the period 1980-81, whereas we split the sample of homeowners according to the value of the house. The
left-hand side variable is nondurable consumption (first column) or its logarithm (second column). YEAR
is a dummy which equals 1 in 1981 and 0 otherwise. ABOVE is a dummy which equals 1 for homeowner
living in house whose value is above the median of the sample values. Controls are the same as in Table A2.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as
follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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